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NOTES
A SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
TO THE PROBLEM OF COMPUTER CRIME
Since the invention of the first computer in the 1950's,1 computers
have become an increasingly pervasive force in American society.2 As
the use of computers for legitimate purposes has increased, the involvement of computers in illegitimate activity has increased as well.3 Unfortunately, the application of traditional legal theories 4 and law enforce-

' See generally J.

SOMA, THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 15-21 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

SOMA]. Although a number of electronic calculating devices appeared during the 1940's, the

machines operated without the benefit of stored programs. Id. at 16. Pioneers in the computer field completed the first machine to operate from an internally stored program in
1950. Id. The first commercially salable computer emerged in 1954. Id. at 17.
1 See Swanson & Territo, Computer Crime: Dimensions, Types, Causes, and Investigation,8 J. OF POLICE ScI. AND AD. 304 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Swanson & Territo].
See generally Computer Systems ProtectionAct of 1979: Hearings on S. 240 Before the
Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 2d Sess.
26-38 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearings](statement of Michael Dertouzos) (predicted
impact of computers on society over next twenty years). In 1976, computers provided jobs
for more than two million people in the United States as programmers, operators, and
maintenance technicians. Volgyes, The Investigation,Prosecution, and Prevention of Computer Crime: A State-of-the-Art Review, 2 ComP. L.J. 385, 386 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Volgyes]. The total number of computers in the United States should double by 1985. Id.
I See United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351, 353 n.6 (4th Cir.) (dictum that computer
crime is increasing rapidly), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977). See generally D. PARKER,
CRIME BY COMPUTER 23-40 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PARKER]; Swanson & Territo, supra
note 2.
Prosecutors at the state level usually have attempted to prosecute computer crimes
under two general areas of criminal law. See A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIE 25 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as BEQUAI]. First, state prosecutors have been able to secure convictions
by alleging various offenses involving habitation. Id. Included in the habitation category are
arson and burglary. Habitation offenses usually occur when the computer is the object of a
crime. Id. at 25-28; sed text accompanying notes 12-13 infra. Additionally, prosecutors have
found that statutes prohibiting certain offenses against property are applicable to many
computer crimes. Id. at 28. The property category includes larceny, embezzlement, false
pretenses, extortion, malicious mischief, forgery, and receipt of stolen property. Id. at 28-34.
The successful prosecution of computer crimes as offenses against property in a particular
state initially will depend on whether the data, program, or equipment falls within the
state's definition of property. See Sokolik, Computer Crime-The Need for Deterrent
Legislation, 2 Comp. L.J. 353, 376 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sokolik]; see, e.g., ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2301 E. 8 (Supp. 1980); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(7) (Supp. 1980) (West); VA.
CODE § 18.2-98.1 (Supp. 1980).
Attempts to prosecute computer crimes at the federal level usually have employed
the federal mail fraud statute in 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). See United States v. Curtis, 537
F.2d 1091, 1093 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 962 (1976); United States v. Kelly, Crim.
#77-250 (E.D. Pa. 1977); BEQUAT, supra, at 37-38. For the mail fraud statute to apply, the
criminal must have used the United States Postal Service in a fraudulent scheme. 18 U.S.C.
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ment techniques often has restricted law enforcement in the computer
field.5 A number of United States legislators have proposed federal
legislation8 as a means of managing the fertile areas for crime created by
the continued inundation of society by computer technology.7 Although
§ 1341 (1976). Another drawback to the application of the mail fraud statute to computer
crime is that the maximum penalty available under § 1341 is a $1000 fine and five years in
prison, even though the crime may have involved significantly larger sums of money. Id.; cf.
text accompanying note 57 infra.
Other federal statutes that have been useful in the prosecution of computer crime are
the statutes prohibiting fraud perpetrated through interstate communication wires, 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (1976), statutes prohibiting the receipt and interstate transportation of stolen
securities, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (1976), the bank crime statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 656-57 (1976),
and the federal embezzlement and theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976). See United States v.
Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 153 (1978) (conviction under wire fraud statute), cert denied, 441 U.S.
922 (1979); United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1977) (applicability of securities
laws to computerized check thefts); United States v. Lambert, 446 F. Supp. 890, (D. Conn.
1978) (applicability of federal embezzlement statute to information derived from government computer); United States v. Sampson, 6 CoMP. L. SERV. REP. 879, 880 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(federal embezzlement statute applied to theft of computer time). See generally Volgyes,
supra note 2, at 394-399.
' See text accompanying notes 23-51 infra.
' See Federal Computer Systems Protection Act (FCSPA), S. 240, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980); H. R. 6192, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H. 12352 (daily ed. Dec. 19,
1979) [hereinafter cited as FCSPA].
I The foremost reason for the computer's exceptional vulnerability to crime is that
each stage in a computer's operation provides opportunities for the enterprising criminal.
See BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 9; Gammer, Computer Crime, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 370, 372-74
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Gammer]. By altering the input on which the computer will
operate, the criminal can control the form and content of the computer product. See BEQUAI,
supra note 4, at 9-10. By inputting false data into the computer, the criminal can cloak his
crime in the seemingly legitimate form of computer output. See PARKER, supra note 3, at 21
(computer used as a symbol to intimidate, deceive, or defraud). Moreover, since input
mistakes are common, the criminal can blame any discovered alterations of input on
unintentional error. See BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 10.
Programming is the next stage of computer operation. See id. The program is the instructions the computer follows to perform the particular desired task. See id. By
manipulating the computer program, the criminal can control the actual operation of the
computer without having to alter the input to achieve a fraudulent result. See id. To the extent that the overall program is likely to be very complex, program changes are extremely
difficult to locate. See id.
Of less importance to the ordinary criminal is the central processing unit (CPU) stage
of the computer's operation. The CPU provides the core intelligence for the basic computer
functions of information storage and retrieval, and reading, decoding, and following the
chosen program. See id. The CPU is not readily alterable as are computer input and programs. Since the CPU is not easily manipulated for criminal purposes, the CPU's potential
role in a crime is as a possible target for terrorists or the object of vandalism or theft. See
id at 10-11; Roddy, The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, 7 RUTGERS J. OF
COMP., TECH, AND THE L. 343, 348 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Roddy] (any type of induced
CPU malfunction could effectively ruin computer user by destroying data bases).
The next stage of computer operation is output. Output is normally valuable to the
computer criminal for the information the output contains. See id. Thus, the output is most
likely to be the object of theft, rather than manipulation. See BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 11.
The final stage in computer operation is the communication process. See id. The com-
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the proposed legislation creates clearly applicable legal sanctions for
most computer improprieties,8 the legislation does not provide for increased prevention, detection, and reporting of computer crime.' A
legislative attempt to control computer crime should go beyond merely
identifying and prohibiting certain activities.
The term "computer crime" encompasses a broad range of activities.10 In general, computer crime consists of volitional, nonviolent acts involving a computer. The acts cause someone to suffer or potentially suffer damage, and through these criminal acts the perpetrator receives or
could receive a benefit." There are four general categories of computer
crime. 2 The first type of computer crime occurs when the computer is
the object of some illicit activity.'3 Sabotage or theft of the computer are
examples of crimes involving the computer as the object of the crime."
Situations in which the computer provides the necessary environment
for the crime comprise the second type of computer crime.'" For example, although theft or destruction of computer programs may be a
serious loss to a company,16 the value of a computer program without a
computer is negligible.' 7 The third variety of computer crime occurs
when the computer is the instrument of the crime.' 8 Anytime a criminal
uses the computer's data processing capabilities to perpetrate a crime,
the computer is an instrument of the crime.' 9 An example of this type of
crime is programming a computer to write checks automatically to an
unauthorized payee. 0 The final category of computer crime involves us-

munication process refers to the transmission of data, whether input or output, to and from
remote terminals and computers. See id. The principal opportunities for crime in the communications process involve interception of data and unauthorized use of a computer
through access to a remote terminal. See id.; Roddy, supra, at 348-49.
' See FCSPA, supra note 6; supra note 2; Sokolik, supra note 4, at 378.
' See text accompanying notes 66-76 infra.
See generally PARKER, supra note 3, at 12-22.
" See McLaughlin, Computer Crime: The Ribicoff Amendment to United States
Code, Title 18, 2 CR. JUST. J. 217, 219-20 (1979) [hereinafter cited as McLaughlin]; accord
1980 Hearings,supra note 2, at 10 (remarks of Colo. Attorney General MacFarlane) (computer crime is crime involving use or operation of computers).
See Gemignani, Computer Crime: The Law in '80, 13 IND. L. REV. 681, 682-83 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Gemignani].
" See PARKER, supra note 3, at 17-19; Gemignani, supra note 12, at 682.
" See PARKER, supra note 3, at 211-27 (situation involving computer sabotage).
" See id. at 19-20; Gemignani, supra note 12, at 682-83.
"8A business' expenditures for computer programs often represent more than half of
the total investment required for electronic data processing operations. 1980 Hearings,
supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Michael Dertouzos).
11Cf. Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967) (court refused to accept valuation
of computer program based on the value of paper on which program was printed).
"S See PARKER, supra note 3, at 20-21; Gemignani, supra note 12, at 683.
2

See PARKER, supra note 3, at 20.

' See United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1977) (altered input causing issuance of unauthorized checks).
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ing a computer as a symbol in the perpetration of a crime. 1 The use of
computerized documents to add an aura of authenticity to a fraudulent
scheme represents the symbolic presence of a computer in a crime.'
Although the many types of computer crimes pose obvious threats
to society, control of computer crime is often very difficult.' Statistics
indicate that only 1 in every 100 computer crimes are detected.24
Moreover, the risk of prosecution for a computer crime is only 1 in
22,000.2" Despite the low risk, the potential yield from computer crime is
high. 26 One study states that the average proceeds from a computer
crime are $450,000.1 While the average bank robbery results in a $10,000
loss, computer bank frauds average $193,000 per incident.' The magnitude of the possible yield coupled with the relatively low risk illustrates
the attractiveness of the computer to existing and potential criminals.
While the opportunity for low risk-high yield crime has grown as
computer use has become more widespread,' the capabilities of law enforcement officials to fight computer crime have not improved with the
same speed." The first hurdle confronting law enforcement officials is
the detection of existing crimes." The low visibility of most computer
crime 12 makes discovery of such crimes through police initiated action
difficult. Sources outside of law enforcement agencies ordinarily bring
about investigations by reporting detected incidents." Unfortunately,
only 1 in 5 detected computer crimes are reported." The reluctance of
those persons who discover computer improprieties to report discoveries impedes police attempts to control computer crime."
See PARKER, supra note 3, at 21-22; Gemignani, supra note 12, at 683.
See United States v. Curtis, 537 F.2d 1091, 1093 (10th Cir. 1976) (manually maintained dating service advertised as being "computerized").
21 See text accompanying notes 29-51 infra.
24 Federal Computer Systems ProtectionAct. Hearings on S. 1766 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2nd. Sess. 4
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings] (statement of Senator Biden).
2 Swanson & Territo, supra note 2, at 305; Volgyes, supra note 2, at 388.
" See Volgyes, supra note 2, at 386-87.
27 See Gemignani, supra note 12, at 686; Taber, A Survey of Computer Crime Studies,
2 COMP. L.J. 275, 307 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Survey].
" 1978 Hearings, supra note 24, at 18 (statement of Senator Percy).
See Volgyes, supra note 2, at 386.
See 1978 Hearings,supra note 22, at 24 (discussion between Senators Biden and Percy).
c) See Volgyes, supra note 2, at 395.
= See Sokolik, supra note 4, at 359; note 85 infra.
13See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 10 (remarks of Colo. Attorney General MacFarlane).
1 1978 Hearings, supra note 24, at 33 (remarks of F.B.I. Chief Hennehan) and 46
(remarks of Senator Biden). Examples of sources outside of law enforcement agencies that
report computer improprieties are auditors, informants, and suspicious business managers.
21
2

" Id. at 18 (statement of Senator Percy); cf Swanson & Territo, supra note 2, at 305
(15/o of computer crimes are detected and reported).
111978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 11 (statement of Senator Ribicoff).
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Once reported, a computer crime continues to pose problems to law
enforcement officials during investigation. The complex computer
technology that helps to camouflage criminal activity 7 may confound the
ordinary detective.' Computer crime often involves complex technological concepts. 9 To conduct an investigation of a computer crime, a detective may need special training to understand the particular crime."
Frequently, local law enforcement agencies are reluctant or unable to
commit the resources necessary to provide skills in basic computer
crime investigation."1 Even at the federal level, formal courses in computer crime investigation are recent additions to police training curricula and the courses are limited to relatively few agents."2 The overall
lack of technical training puts the police at a major disadvantage in dealing with the computer criminal."
In addition to problems at the detection and investigation stages,
complications also arise in prosecuting a computer crime. Only a few
states have statutes specifically directed at computer crime." Federal
prosecutors have no directly applicable code provisions upon which to
rely," but the United States Code contains 40 sections that federal
prosecutors can adapt to computer crime. 6 As a result, most state and
all federal prosecutors must charge computer criminals for other crimes
that may apply in the computer situation. 7 Although the statute may
3 See Sokolik, supra note 4, at 359. Since the computer usually stores data in machinereadable forms only and data processing takes place within the computer, the investigator
ordinarily lacks the opportunity to examine questionable documents without alerting the
operators of the computer system. See Roddy, supra note 7, at 349.
- See State v. Thommen, No. 79-424B (Crim. Ct. Marion Co., Ind. Feb. 14, 1980),
reviewed by Gemignani, supra note 12, at 713-18. In Thommen, the defendant was convicted
of the thefts of computer time. Gemignani, supra note 11, at 713-15. The nature of Thornmen's crime was so complex, however, that an investigator trained in computer crime investigation spent nearly a year trying to understand the unauthorized activities after the
improprieties surfaced. Id. at 715.
See Gammer, supra note 7, at 373 n.1744.
, See 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 43-44 (discussion between Senator Biden and
F.B.I. Chief Barko).
" See BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 57. Compare 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 10
(remarks of Colo. Attorney General MacFarlane) (technical expertise at local law enforcement level not needed) with 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 54 (statement of National
District Attorneys Ass'n Chairman Falke) (necessity of specialized expertise).
See 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 34 (statement of F.B.I. Chief Hennehan).
See id. Although law enforcement officials generally lack technical training in the
computer field, computer criminals are usually well educated and technically competent.
See BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 4.
" See generally Krieger, Current andProposed Computer Crime Legislation,2 ComP.
L.J. 721 (1980).
1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 11 (statement of Senator Ribicoff).
"

'

See note 4 supra.
See, e.g., United States v..Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 155 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.

Jones, 553 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1977). In Seidlitz, the defendant was accused of the
unauthorized use of a former employer's computer. 589 F.2d at 155. The defendant had gain-
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prohibit the particular conduct involving the computer, the elements of
the crime and the sanctions imposed for commission of the crime are not
tailored to the computer setting.48 Not only do prosecutors often encounter difficulty fitting the facts of a computer incident into the
elements of a more traditional crime,49 but often the punishment provided
for the crime is not commensurate with the gravity of the crime in a
computer context." The lack of prohibitions specifically applicable to
computer crime often hinders attempts to bring the computer criminal
to justice. 1 In short, law enforcement officials are likely to have problems at every stage of the fight against computer crime.
The criminal potential of the computer and the problems associated
with the detection and prosecution of computer crimes led to the introduction in 1977 of the Federal Computer Systems Protection Act
(FCSPA) As revised in 1980,' the FCSPA would prohibit the use or
attempted use of a computer,54 either as an instrument or a symed access to the computer, which was located in Maryland, by telephone through terminals
located in Virginia and Maryland. Id at 154-55. Although the trial court convicted the defendant of perpetrating a fraud through interstate wires, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976), the trial court
dismissed as inapplicable the count of the indictment charging the defendant with interstate
transportation of stolen property. 589 F.2d at 155 n.12; 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 29
(statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Keeney). If the defendant bad accessed
the computer only from the location in Maryland, conviction under federal law would have
been unlikely. See Roddy, supra note 7, at 355.
In Jones, the defendant's accomplice altered input data to instruct the computer to
write unauthorized checks to the order of the defendant. 553 F.2d at 353-54. The defendant
was charged with the interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained checks in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (1976). 553 F.2d at 352. The trial court dismissed the charges on the
ground that the checks were forgeries which are expressly excluded from the provisions of
the federal statute. United States v. Jones, 414 F. Supp. 964, 971 (D. Md. 1976); see 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2314-15 (1976). The circuit court reversed the dismissal stating that the issuance of the
check by the computer made the check a fraud rather than a forgery. 553 F.2d at 356. Thus,
the checks did not come within the exceptions to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (1976). 553 F.2d at 356.
," See Sokolik, supra note 4, at 371-73.
" See United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351, 355-56 (appellate court reversal of trial
court finding that computer written check to unauthorized payee constituted forgery).
0 See BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 5-6.
51 See 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 28 (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Keeney).
S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 21025 (1977).
S. 240, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980). See generally McLaughlin, supra note 11; Roddy, supra note 7; Comment, Computer Crime-Senate Bill S. 240, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV.
660 (1980). S. 240 received the unanimous approval of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal
Law on November 6, 1979. The bill has not received the approval of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. See Gammer, supra note 6, at 382 n. 1826, 384. Although Congress has yet to
enact the FCSPA, the bill has served as a model for most recent state legislation in the computer crime area. See Becker, The Trial of a Computer Crime, 2 CoMP. L.J. 441, 447 (1980);

see, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301, 13-2316 (1978); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §

752.791-.797 (Supp. 1980); R. I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-1 to 4 (Supp. 1979).
" The FCSPA defines "computer" as any device that performs "logical, arithmetic,
and storage functions by electronic manipulation." S. 240, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 3(c)(1)
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bol, 55 for any fraudulent purpose. 6 The FCSPA provides a maximum

penalty for violation of these prohibitions of 5 years imprisonment and a
fine equal to twice the amount of gain derived from the crime or $50,000,
whichever is greater.57 The FCSPA also prohibits the unauthorized, intentional damaging of a computer. 8 The maximum penalty for causing prohibited computer damage is 5 years in prison and a fine of $50,000.1' The
prohibitions of the FCSPA apply to any computer used by the federal
government"' or any financial institution"' and all computers which affect
interstate commerce.2 The enumerated categories cover virtually every
computer operated in the United States. 3 To avoid discouraging state
and local attempts to control computer crime, the FCSPA provides for
concurrent federal, state, and local jurisdiction over individual computer
crimes." The overall thrust of the FCSPA is to deter computer crime
through imposition of direct legal sanctions for most computer crimes. 5
As a major means of controlling computer crime, the present provisions of the FCSPA are inadequate. If computer crime is serious enough
to warrant legislative attention,6 the drafters of the FCSPA have only

(1980). The definition of computer includes peripheral equipment that is connected to or
operates with a computer. Id For purposes of the FCSPA, automated typewriters,
household-type micro-computers, and hand-held calculator's are excluded expressly from the
definition of a computer. Id.
' See text accompanying notes 19 & 21 supra.
S. 240, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 3(a) (1980).
57Id. at § 3(a)(2).
5 Id. at § 3(b).
Id. at § 3(a)(1)(A).
e' Id. at § 3(a)(1)(B).
Id. at § 3(a)(2). The authors of the FCSPA intended the term "operates in interstate
commerce" to have an expansive meaning. 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 25 (remarks of
Senator Biden).
Is See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 4 (statement of Senator Laxalt); Roddy, supra
note 7, at 350.
S. 240, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 3(d). The FCSPA provides that federal prosecutors
should use discretion in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a computer crime
that also falls within state or local jurisdiction. Id The bill states that a federal official's
decision whether to exercise jurisdiction should include consideration of the gravity of the
offense, the extent of federal interest in the crime, the resources available to state and local
authorities, and the traditional federal role with respect to the crime. Id. The provisions
calling for federal discretion in exercising jurisdiction were not part of the earlier versions
of the FCSPA. See S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The addition of the provisions probably resulted from suggestions by critics of the bill that the broad grant of federal jurisdiction in the FCSPA unnecessarily injects the federal government into situations that are
essentially local. See 1980 hearings,supra note 2, at 53-54 (statement of National District
Attorneys Ass'n Chairman Falke).
" 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 6 (statement of Senator Ribicoff).
m At least one commentator argues that a computer crime is actually nothing more
than a standard crime with the computer as one component of the factual setting. Taber, On
Computer Crime (Senate Bill S. 240), 1 Comp. L.J. 517, 537 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
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partially addressed the problem.87 Although prosecutors of computer
crimes have had to rely on tangentially related criminal statutes," virtually no criminal prosecution has failed for lack of statutory sanction.'9
A district attorney, however, cannot prosecute an undiscovered or
unreported computer crime. Furthermore, any preventive or deterrent
effect of clearly applicable, strict penalties exists only to the extent that
the courts are able to apply the penalties to detected illegal acts.70 Thus,
the solution to the problem of rising computer crime should couple
measures directed toward detection and prevention with the creation of
direct legal sanctions.7
In addition to prevention and detection, a legislative attempt to control computer crime should address the public's reluctance to report
discovered computer crimes. The usual response to increased crime is in72
creased government spending on law enforcement in the affected area.
Undoubtedly, increased funding of law enforcement projects on computer crime would facilitate the investigation and prosecution of
reported incidents. 73 As in many areas of whitecollar crime," however,
investigations of computer crime are limited to cases in which unofficial
Taber]. The same authority also argues that the results of studies measuring computer
crimes are statistically invalid. Id. at 523. See generally Survey, supra note 27. Above all,
the authority contends that assuming the validity of computer crime statistics, computer
crime is insignificant in comparison to white-collar crime as a whole. Taber, supra, at 518.
See generally PARKER, supra note 3, at 294-95.
" See Sokolik, supra note 4, at 373-74 (sponsors of FCSPA have limited objectives in
legislation).
See note 4 supra.

1980 Hearings,supra note 2, at 4 (statement of Senator Laxalt); see id., supra note 2,
at 10 (statement of Colo. Attorney General MacFarlane) (detection, not prosecution, poses
largest problem in controlling computer crime).
70 1978 Hearings, supra note 24, at 112 (letter of Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Keeney).
71One example of legislation that coupled provisions criminalizing certain acts with
provisions specifically aimed at prevention and detection of the prohibited act is the Antihijacking Act of 1974, PuB. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409 (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.). Under the Antihijacking Act, Congress provided stiff penalties for anyone who hijacks or attempts to hijack an airplane. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n) (1976). The Air Transportation
Security Act of 1974, PUB. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 415 (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.) provided for the promulgation of regulations for the screening of passengers for
weapons and the implementation of strict airport security measures. Id. §§ 1356-57. Congress authorized the Federal Aviation Administration to conduct research and development
projects designed to protect passengers and property from air piracy. Id. § 1357(d)(1).
" See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-9, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2112, 2115-23. In 1968, Congress responded to reports of growing crime in
the United States by establishing the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to administer grants to individual states to fight crime. Id. at 2114-16.
" See 1978 Hearings,supra note 22, at 34 (statement of F.B.I. Chief Henehan) (F.B.I.
does not have adequate investigative resources to deal with all types of computer crime).
" Computer crime is one variety of white-collar crime. Volgyes, supra note 2, at 387.
White-collar crime is usually characterized as nonviolent illegal acts perpetrated by deceit
or concealment. A. BEQUAI, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A 20TH-CENTURY CRISIS 1-3 (1978).
'
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sources report alleged improprities to the authorities.75 The scarcity of
detected and subsequently reported crimes would limit the impact of
successful investigations that increased funding would make possible.7"
Thus, since effective enforcement of computer crime laws depends, in
large part, on increased reporting of discovered crimes, Congress should
encourage those who uncover computer improprieties to report to law
enforcement authorities.
Assuming that legislation should include measures directly aimed at
prevention, detection, and reporting of computer crime, attention must
focus on what available alternatives would accomplish these three objectives. The prevention and detection of computer crime depends almost
entirely on the adequacy of computer security measures.77 Reporting
discovered computer irregularities78 simply depends upon the decision of
the discoverer to take appropriate action when an incident occurs.
Therefore, legislation directed toward improving prevention, detection,
and reporting must focus on the persons involved in the design and
operation of computers who have responsibility for overseeing security
procedures and who are most likely to discover computer improperties.
The three groups that meet these qualifications are the users of computers, 9 the manufacturers of computers,"0 and the outside auditor of
"' See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
See BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 19; PARKER, supra note 3, at 275-76; Sokolik, supra note
4, at 368-70. Computer security measures fall into four general categories. See generally J.
CARROLL, COMPUTER SECURITY (1977) [hereinafter cited as CARROLL]; L. KRAUSS & A.
MACGAHAN, COMPUTER FRAUD AND COUNTERMEASURES (1979) [hereinafter cited as KRAUSS &
MACGAHAN]. The first category is comprised of physical controls. Physical controls include
regulations governing actual physical access to computer, programs, data, and output.
Management of the computer's physical environment is also a physical control. See CARROLL, supra, at 81-94; KRAUSS & MACGAHAN, supra at 115-21. Communications controls are
another category of security measures. Any method designed to protect data transmission,
such as a device that prevents or detects wiretapping, is a communications control. See CARROLL, supra at 139-205. The next variety of security methods is systems controls. Systems
controls may involve isolation of individual components of the computer system through the
use of user logs and time allotments. Restricted circulation of operations manuals or programs that control user access are also systems controls. See KRATISS & MACGAHAN, Supra,
at 179-190. The final category is hardward controls. Hardward controls are mechanical controls builts into the computer to lessen the opportunity for improper use of the computer.
See PARKER, supra note 3, at 276. Examples of hardward controls are machine-maintained
logs of individual user numbers and times and restrictions on acceptable programming
languages. See KRAUSS & MACGAHAN, supra, at 190-95.
" The term "irregularities" is an auditing term connoting all intentional misrepresentations, misappropriations, and defalcations. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Professional Standards AU § 327.03.
In general, the term "users" refers to users of computers in the private sector.
Government computer operations are subject to regulations and security procedures that
do not apply to computer systems in the private sector. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)
(regulation of the collection, storage and dissemination of personal information by federal
agencies); 41 C.F.R. §§ 101-36.000 to 36.1207 (1980) (regulations governing management of
automatic data processing equipment used by the federal government).
" See text accompanying notes 97-110 infra.
"
"
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computer users." Each group possesses a different potential for having
an impact on each of the three objectives of prevention, detection, and
reporting.
The users of computer systems have the largest stake in preventing
and detecting computer crime.2 The costs and uncertainties associated
with computer crime have an immediate effect on the user." Moreover,
the user is in the best position to develop and implement basic security
measures for the computer system.u Although implementation and
maintenance of proper external security measures would prevent most
computer crimes,85 users of computers generally have failed to initiate
" The auditor's certification that a business' financial statements represent fairly the
financial condition of the company plays a major role in the business community. See
Besser, Privity?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties,
7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507, 507 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Besser]. See generally Comment,
Accountant's Liabilityfor Negligence-A ContemporaryApproach For a Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 401-08 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ContemporaryApproach].
Not only do many creditors and investors in small business rely on the auditor's opinion, the
opinion is a necessity to virtually all medium and large companies. Federal securities laws
require all companies with more than 500 shareholders and more than $1,000,000 in total
assets to file audited financial statements with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g)(1)(B) & 78m(a)(2) (1976).
8 In 1974, the United States Chamber of Commerce estimated that annual losses attributable to computer crime exceeded $100 million. 1978 Hearings, supra note 24, at 57
(statement of Donn Parker). Current estimates of annual losses due to computer crime
range as high as $300 million. See Swanson & Territo, supra note 2, at 305.
" Direct financial losses are only part of the detrimental effect that computer crime
has on the user. Computer crime also results in a distortion of financial statements which
causes economic dislocation as managers try to cure fictitious financial problems. See
KRAUSS & MACGAHAN, supra note 77, at 23-24 (fraudulent debits). Also, in many cases the
victim may not even miss the property that is the subject of the computer crime. Nevertheless, the crime may result in the deterioration of the user's competitive position. For instance, criminal access to a trade secret stored in a computer could do irreparable harm to
the owner of the secret. See Ward v. Superior Court, 3 COMP. L. SERv. REP. 206 (Super. Ct.
Cal. 1972) (theft by telephone of computer program from one computer service company by
employee of another computer service company).
" See note 77 supra. Although the computer user may not be capable of installing
hardware controls, only the user can require that purchased computer systems have adequate hardware controls. See text accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
" See text accompanying note 77 supra. In addition to the obvious direct effect of
security measures, the implementation and enforcement of standard security procedures
also provides an indirect impetus to computer crime detection. Although even the best
crime prevention techniques cannot ensure crime-free operation of all computer systems, a
comprehensive prevention plan deprives the computer criminal of the natural camouflage of
the computer. See Sokolik, supra note 4, at 370 (prevention techniques provide greater
capacity for early discovery of wrongdoings). Much of the present problem of computer
crime stems from the ability of the criminal to use the computer as an anonymous tool in the
perpetration of crime. See Volgyes, supra note 2, at 393; note 37 supra.By creating internal
and external documentation of all computer operations and controlling access to the computer system, security procedures not only deter the criminal, but also provide a trail for
audit or investigation if suspicions about an employee's activities arise. See KRAUSS &
MACGAHAN, supra note 77, at 345 (sources of investigation).
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proper security measures in the operation of their computer systems.8
Even when users implement proper security measures, a lack of maintenance and enforcement of existing security procedures can undermine
the security system's effectiveness in crime detection. 7 Furthermore,
many users are reluctant to report crimes that security procedures un1 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 33 (remarks of Joseph Henehan) & 59 (statement of
Donn Parker); see PARKER, supra note 3, at 284; McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 232-33;
Sokolik, supra note 4, at 368. The failure of computer users to provide adequate controls
stems, in part, from the complexity of the computer. See Roddy, supra note 7, at 346;
Sokolik, supra note 4, at 392. While computer technology has accelerated over the past thirty
years, top management has left the details of operation of the computer to the systems
analysts and programmers who understand the system. See Roddy, supra note 7, at 346;
Swanson & Territo, supra note 2, at 305. Unfortunately, by placing responsibility for security
in the hands of employees versed in computer technology, management places trust in
employees who are unlikely to have training in auditing and security techniques, but are
best able to perpetrate fraud. See Sokolik, supra note 4, at 366. In such a scheme, the
dishonest employee has a vested interest in not recommending effective security controls
whereas the honest employee sees no need for controls.
The more top management disassociates itself with the day-to-day operation of the
company's computer system, the more reliance on the quantitative indications of computer
performance grows. See generally R. THIERAUF, DATA PROCESSING FOR BUSINESS AND
MANAGEMENT 573-604 (1973) (computer security expenditures as function of desired degree
of accuracy and acceptable cost). Management ordinarily views the installation of a computer as a means of processing data more efficiently than a manual system. Thus, the costs
associated with the operation and maintenance of the computer are an all-important
measure of the system's performance. See Sokolik, supra note 4, at 370-71. The ordinarily
invisible nature of computer fraud and the immediately apparent cost of increased computer
security have caused management to look askance at efforts to increase computer security.
See KRAUSS & MAcGAHAN, supra note 77, at 411-12; Sokolik, supra note 4, at 370. The
general lack of appreciation for the devastating opportunities the computer offers to the
technologically inclined criminal reinforces management's reluctance to increase security
outlays. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra; 1978 Hearings, supra note 24, at 65
(remarks of Donn Parker).
Although inaction on the part of computer users has contributed to a lack of computer
crime prevention in the past, there are indications of a growing awareness of the problem
and resultant attempts to deal with it. Id. Increased public awareness of the criminal propensities of the computer has resulted from recent revelations of massive computer frauds
in major companies and government. See, e.g., Hel & Lancaster, Fraud at Wells Fargo
Depended on Avoiding Computer's Red Flags, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1981, at 1, col. 6; Hollie,
PoliceRecount Theft by Wire of $10 Million, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1978 § A, at 11, col. 1; U.S.
Aide Held in $500,000 Theft by Computer, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1980 § C, at 3, col. 1. Accordingly, the activities of internal auditors with respect to computer systems and the interest of the audit committees of boards of directors have increased dramatically. See 1978
Hearings,supra note 24, at 82-83 (remarks of Robert Abbott); PARKER, supra note 3, at
286-87.
The federal government has recently introduced standards of security control for computers that are applicable to all branches of the federal government. See note 79 supra. To
the extent that increased awareness by computer users results in concrete improvements in
security controls, computer crime prevention will benefit. See Volgyes, supra note 2, at 402.
Thus far, however, computer crime statistics indicate that voluntary measures to control
computer crime have been unsuccessful. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
" See BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 22-23.
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8

cover. 8
Reluctance on the part of computer users to adopt voluntary security
measures to prevent computer crime does not suggest that involuntary
requirements are a workable alternative. The original hearings on the

FCSPA19 indicated that licensing of individual computer systems is an

unacceptable method of ensuring compliance with minimum security
procedures." Standard procedures that are applicable to the myriad of
possible computer users would be virtually impossible to develop.9' Once
developed, government attempts to require the user to maintain and enforce the security procedures would result in a regulatory quagmire. In
short, government attempts to stimulate crime prevention and detection
in users of computers may be limited to efforts to increase public
awareness of the computer's potential for crime.92
Although mandatory security requirements are impractical, mandatory reporting requirements for users would be relatively simple to
develop. 3 Nevertheless, the authors of the FCSPA considered and
declined to include a provision mandating that any computer user having
knowledge of a computer crime make a report to law enforcement of" See text accompanying note 35 supra. Among users of computers, reasons given for
declining to report computer crimes include embarrassment, fear of bad publicity and
resulting lack of public confidence, and potential liability to shareholders for negligent
management of computer operations. See 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 11 (statement of
Senator Ribicoff) & 28 (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Keeney); Volgyes,
supra note 2, at 388. Another, less likely reason for the failure to report cases is the opportunity for personal gain from joining forces with the computer criminal. See Swanson &
Territo, supra note 2, at 306.
See note 24 supra.
See 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 51-52 (statement of Senator Biden). At the 1978
Hearings, Senator Biden dismissed the alternative of licensing computer users without giving reasons for his remarks. Id: The Senator's reticence on the subject of licensing probably
stemmed from a national feeling against increased federal regulation especially in a field as
pervasive as computer use. See generally Kennedy, The Delegalization of America, 28
DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1979).
" See Sokolik, supra note 4, at 369 (effective security system design must take into account type of required access and principal system application). The fundamental problems
with mandatory security measures are the effective adaptation of standard security
measures to individual situations and the enforcement of the requirements by the government. The degree of regulation necessary to solve the fundamental problems makes licensing particularly distasteful to legislators. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 24, at 51-52
(remarks of Senator Biden); note 90 supra.
' See 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 154 (letter of Rein Turn) (recommending special
effort to giving FCSPA maximum publicity). Illustrative of legislative efforts to increase
public awareness of possibly prohibited conduct are certain requirements of federal
copyright law. In order to avoid possible liability for copyright infringement, libraries and
archives must display a notice on all photocopy equipment warning users that making a
copy may be subject to the copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1) (1976).
E.g. 21 C.F.R. § 1304.41(b) (1980) (report from distributor of controlled substances
must list thefts).
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ficials.9 Reasons mentioned for non-inclusion of a reporting requirement
ranged from fear of creating distrust within the affected business entity
to doubts about the effectiveness of a reporting requirement. 5 These
reasons do not explain adequately the total absence of provisions in the
FCSPA directed toward encouraging computer users to report crimes."
Unlike users of computers, the manufacturers of computer systems
are in a position to play a significant role only in preventing computer
crime. 7 Ideally, computers should be able to police themselves. Some
authorities on computer security predict that a totally secure computer
system will become a reality," but that security technology is currently
lagging five to eight years behind data processing technology. 0 The major reason for the computer industry's failure to emphasize security innovations is the lack of enthusiasm of computer users for automated
security systems.' 1 Since the relationship between the manufacturer
and the user of a new computer system is purely contractual,' 2 the
manufacturer is willing to provide only those features for which the user
is willing to pay.' Absent express contractual provisions to the contrary, no legal theory attaches liability to the manufacturer for failure to
provide built-in security features.0 4 Without economic incentives or
" See 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 46-47 (discussion between Senator Biden and
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Keeney).
" See id. at 109 (letter of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Keeney).
Cf McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 234 (legislative action designed to require reporting of computer crimes considered unlikely). At first blush, the federal misprision statute
appears to criminalize any knowledge of a computer crime. The statute requires that
anyone having knowledge of the commission of a felony must report the felony or be liable
for up to $500 in fines and 3 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). By making the commission
of computer crime a felony, the FCSPA would seem to 6riminalize failure to report detected
crimes. The courts, however, have interpreted the misprision statute as requiring an affirmative act of concealment before criminal sanctions apply. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 696 n.36 (1972); United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1970).
'7

See PARKER, supra note 3, at 282-85.

See id at 284-85.
"See 1980 Hearings,supra note 2, at 21-22 (remarks of Michael Dertouzos); PARKER
supra note 3, at 284. The independently secure computer would be free from human
maintenance in its day to day operation. Id. The computer would also control any human access and monitor the physical environment surrounding the computer. Id. at 285.
"0 See PARKER, supra note 3, at 284; Sokolik, supranote 4, at 361 (eight to ten year lag).
"I See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 22 (remarks of Michael Dertouzos); PARKER,
supra note 3, at 284.
1 See generally Smith, A Survey of CurrentLegal Issues Arising From Contracts
For Computer Goods and Services, 1 CoMP. L.J. 475 (1979).
"

13 PARKER, supra note 3, at 288.

"I Courts have not extended the warranties of merchantability, Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) § 2-314, and fitness for a particular purpose, U.C.C. § 2-315, to computers that
fall prey to crime. Examination of analogous cases, however, indicates that the U.C.C. warranty provisions may require, under limited circumstances, manufacturer indemnification of
user losses due to computer crime. In Towel Mach. Serv. Corp. v. American Uniform Ren-
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legal liability, manufacturers are unlikely to strive to close the gap between data processing technology and security technology." 5
A legislative response to the computer industry's failure to concentrate on reducing the technological gap could take two forms. First, the
federal government could provide economic encouragement to the development of automated security features.' Just as governmental
economic incentives provided much of the impetus to the fledgling computer industry in the 1940's,"°' government grants or tax incentives
would hasten automated security advancements. Second, Congress could
create a statutory requirement that manufacturers provide minimum
security features in all computer systems. The lack of a continuing relationship between computer manufacturers and users and the plethora of
applications for any computer design, however, would limit the effectiveness of government regulation of computer design." 8 In the abtal, Inc., 7 U.C.C. REP. 162 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970), the court held the supplier of uniform lockers
liable for the value of uniforms taken from the lockers. Id at 163. The court found that,
because a locker is inherently a security device, the supplier had breached an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by supplying lockers that contained duplicate locks.
Id. But see Platt v. American Locker Co., 7 U.C.C. REP. 476 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970) (lessor of
coin-operated locker not liable for theft from locker).
In Chatlos Systems, Inc., v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J.
1979), the court held that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arose
under a contract for the sale of a computer system. Id. at 743. In Chatlos, the computer
manufacturer represented to the buyer that the computer system would perform much of
the buyer's bookkeeping. I& at 741. The Chatlos court reasoned that the manufacturer had
become familiar with the buyer's business and knew that the buyer was relying on the
manufacturer's skill and judgment. Id. at 743. Based on the implied warranty, the court held
the manufacturer liable for fairly extensive consequential damages that resulted when the
computer system failed to perform. Id at 747.
Towel Mach. Serv. Corp. and Chatlos suggest that manufacturer liability for computer
crime losses is possible. Chatlos indicates that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may extend to sellers of computer systems who know the intended use of
the computer. To the extent that a major function of a computer may be the maintenance
and storage of many of a business' assets, a computer has the inherent features of a security
device. Thus, under the reasoning of Towel Machine Service Corp., weaknesses in a computer system that the manufacturer knows will subject a user's assets to theft or destruction, could render the manufacturer liable for lost assets.
"o But see Sokolik, supra note 4, at 374. One commentator contends that computer
manufacturers will reorder their priorities in favor of computer security in the future. Id
The commentator argues that manufacturers desire to avoid liability as accessories to crime
and for malpractice will force changes in emphasis in the design of computer systems. Id
One indication of increasing acceptance by manufacturers of responsibility for computer
security is a recent $40 million project by International Business Machines (IBM) to develop
greater security in the design of IBM computers. Id. at 369-70.
108See SOMA, supra note 1, at 2-3. The federal government provided demand for computers and funds for research in the early stages of computer development. Id- at 1-3. As
computer technology has progressed, however, the flow of federal funds has diminished. Id.
at 3.
107See generally id. at 15-21; note 106 supra.
1I Most of the fundamental problems with federal regulation of user security procedures apply equally to regulation of manufacturers. See note 91 supra.
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sence of a continuing relationship between a manufacturer and a user,
government regulation of computer manufacturers would be ineffective because of the manufacturer's inability to see that the user has not
tampered with the originally secure design."' Moreover, to the extent
that making computer manufacturers statutorily responsible for the
security of their products would lessen the incentive to progress in other
areas of technology, regulation is undesirable. Economic incentives for
the advancement of security technology, however, may prove more rewarding than equal investment in increased enforcement of computer
crime laws. 110
Considering the practical difficulty of user and manufacturer participation in computer crime prevention and detection,"' the outside
auditor's potential contribution gains importance."' To certify the financial statements of a business, the auditor must follow standard auditing
procedures promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public
113
Accountants (AICPA).
One of the procedures currently required in
1
every audit is a review of the client's system of internal control."
Also,
the AICPA prohibits an auditor from conducting an audit without sufficient technical ability to identify and evaluate necessary control features
in all aspects of the client's operations including computer systems.1 '
Specifically, the AICPA requires the auditor to examine computer accounting control procedures,
test the client's compliance with
previously implemented procedures," and evaluate the adequacy of
security procedures of particular computer systems. 18
The auditor's examination does not, however, have a direct effect on

11 See PARKER, supra note 3, at 283 (manufacturer ability to control security of computer ends after computer comes under control of user.)
110See

text accompanying notes 72-76 and 97-101 supra.
m See text accompanying notes 89-92 and 106-07 supra.
,1ISee PARKER, supra note 3, at 297 (computer security will depend principally on
auditing function until development of more powerful technological solutions).

"I KRAUSS & MACGAHAN, supra note 77, at 335; H. SELLIN, ATTORNEY'S HANDBOOK OF

ACCOUNTING 1-27 to 1-28 (1974). The AICPA is the national professional society of certified
public accountants. Over 160,000 certified public accountants currently are members of the
AICPA. Letter of William S. Kanaga (Chairman of the Board, AICPA) to Robert Couch
(March 10, 1981).
lI" AICPA Professional Standards AU § 320.01; see note 41 supra. The term "internal
control" refers to all the measures adopted within a business to safeguard assets, ensure accuracy and reliability of financial records, and encourage operational efficiency and
adherence to proscribed procedures. Id. § 320.09. A business' system of internal control includes measures adopted to safeguard the computer system. Id. § 321.02.
115Id. § 321.04.
I's Id. § 321.24.
"

Id. § 321.27.

I" Id. § 321.31. As the size of the computer installation under examination increases,
the corresponding auditing standard of care may increase as well. Bigelow, The
Accountant's PotentialLegal Exposure When Providing Computer Services and Advice
(1975), reprinted in BIGELOW, 4 Comp. L. SERV. § 5-1, Art. 5, at 10 [hereinafter cited as
Bigelow]; see text accompanying notes 122-25 infra.
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the outcome of the audit. The auditor's examination of the client's computer security controls is not designed to detect all potential computer
crimes."' Instead, the quality of the client's internal control helps to
determine the extent of testing the auditor must perform to certify that
the client's statements fairly represent the company's condition. 10 The
AICPA does not require the auditor to state a conclusion on the vulnerability of the client's computer system to criminals. 21 If fraud surfaces
within the business, the degree of professional care exercised in performing the audit will determine the auditor's liability for negligence."
AICPA Professional Standards AU § 327.11. See generally id. § 327.
Id. § 320.01. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 431 (6th Cir.
1980) (auditor's review of client's computer security measures not designed primarily to
discover weaknesses in internal control).
21 Although the auditor need not give an opinion on the overall integrity of the client's
system of internal control to certify the client's financial statements, the client can engage
the auditor to conduct a formal review of the client's internal control. See AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards No. 30 (superceding AIGPA Professional Standards AU §§ 640
& 641) [hereinafter cited as SAS 30] (reporting on internal control).
"2Social Sec. Admin. Baltimore Fed. Credit Union v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 639,
657 (D. Md. 1956); Delmar Vineyard v. Timmons, 486 S.W.2d 914, 920 (Tenn. App. 1972),
cert. denied by Tenn. Supreme Court, Nov. 6, 1972. Since an auditor's report may reach a
broad range of parties who rely on the auditor's opinion of the fairness of the client's financial statements, the auditor's potential liability may depend on the position of the party
seeking damages. The client can base an action against an auditor in contract or tort. Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Gas. Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116, 118 (1934); L. B.
Lab., Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d 385, 388 (1952). But see East Grand Forks v.
Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 141 N.W. 181, 182 (1913) (auditor ordinarily liable only for breach of
contract not negligence). Although the contract sets forth the scope of the auditor's examination, whether or not the auditor has performed the requested services adequately
may be a matter of professional malpractice. See generally Annot. 92 A.L.R.3d. 396 (1979).
Malpractice claims subsequent to a completed audit ordinarily arise when either a
material mistake surfaces in the business' financial statements or a defalcation is discovered
within the client's organization. In determining whether an auditor is liable for mistakes or
defalcations, a court will hold the auditor to a higher standard of care than a nonprofessional. See Gormley, Accountant's Professional Liability-A Ten-Year Review, 29 Bus.
LAW. 1205, 1206 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Gormley]. The auditor must exercise a degree of
knowledge, skill, and judgement normally possessed by members of the auditing profession.
Stanley L. Block, Inc., v. Klein, 45 Misc.2d 1054, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
Delmar Vineyard v. Timmons, 486 S.W.2d at 920.
In addition to possible liability to the client, the auditor also may be liable to third parties who have relied on the auditor's report. See generally Besser, supra note 81; Contemporary Approach, supra note 81. Following common law principles requiring privity of contract, many courts have refused to grant relief to parties other than the primary beneficiary
of the audit. See, e.g., Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th
Cir. 1971); Investment Corp. of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291, 295-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 444-47 (1931). The modern
trend, however, is to make the negligent auditor subject to suits by any member of the class
whose reliance on the financial statements is foreseeable. Adams, Lessening the Legal
Liability of Auditors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1037, 1041 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Adams]; see, e.g.,
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 92-93 (D.R.I. 1968); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
(1977).
Third parties also may proceed against an auditor under federal securities law. See
1

il
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Absent extra-ordinary circumstances that require irregular auditing
standards or accounting procedures,1" an auditor can avoid liability by
showing that the audit conformed to Generally Accepted Auditing Standards1 2' as promulgated by the AICPA.'2
Compared with law enforcement officials, users, and manufacturers
of computer systems, independent auditors are in the best position to
contribute to the prevention and detection of computer crime. The
AICPA requires auditors to maintain a technical proficiency in the computer area. 12 By reviewing the client's system of internal control the
auditor becomes familiar with the client's use of electronic data processgenerally Gormley, supra,at 1216-22. In Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court held an accounting firm liable under § 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), for material misstatements in the client's financial statements.
283 F. Supp. at 703. Section 11 provides that auditors or other experts who contribute to the
compilation of registration statements may be liable for material misstatements contained
in the statements, irrespective of any privity between the auditor and the plaintiff. 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). The auditor may assert his due diligence in performing the audit as a
defense to a § 11 claim. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (1976). The extent of the auditors due
diligence depends upon his adherence to Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. Escott v.
BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. at 703.
In addition to the statutory cause of action contained in § 11, a third party may have an
implied right of action against an auditor under SEC rule 10b-5. Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Under rule 10b-5 an auditor may be liable for
material false statements made in connection with the purchase or sale of any securities.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (1942). The Supreme Court has held, however,
that mere negligence is insufficient to sustain an action under rule 10b-5. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). To impose liability upon an auditor under rule 10b-5,
the court must find that the auditor intended to deceive, manipulate, or defraud through the
false statement. Id.
12 If an audit requires irregular auditing procedures or a financial statement follows
accounting principles that are noir generally accepted by the accounting profession, the
auditor's report must disclose the irregularities or accounting principles. AICPA Professional Standards AU §§ 509.10, 509.18-.19.
"' See ContemporaryApproach, supra note 81, at 402 n.10. The Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards consist of three general standards, three standards of field work, and
four standards of reporting. AICPA Professional Standards AU § 150.02. The AICPA has
adopted not only the ten overall standards, but also detailed explanations describing the effect of each standard on the particular audit. See generally AICPA Professional Standards
AU §§ 200-561.
5" Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1108 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); cf. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Natl Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff,
Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 852 (4th Cir. 1972) (AICPA standards constitute auditor's
minimum duty to client). But see United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805 (2d-Cir. 1969),
cert denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970). (auditor's criminal liability for conspiracy depends on
auditor's good faith); 1136 Tenants' Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co., 27 App. Div.2d 830, 277
N.Y.S.2d 996, 997-98 (1967) (accountant held liable for defalcation despite technical
adherence to auditing standards), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 995, 290 N.Y.S.2d 919, 238 N.E.2d 322
(1968). One authority has stated that the auditor's standard of care in an audit involving
large computer installations is greater than the standard required by AICPA standards.
Bigelow, supra note 118, at 10. See generally ContemporaryApproach, supra note 81, at 408
n.43.
12 See text accompanying note 115 supra.
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ing'I and the effect that the computer has on the individual client.1" In
addition, because the auditor reviews a number of different operations,
he has the ability to compare the security measures employed by different users and provide each client with suggestions on available alternatives. Most importantly, the auditor's complete independence from the
organization he is auditing129 enables the auditor to examine a business'
computer system objectively without being subject to the biases and influences of the individual work setting."'0 Thus, the outside auditor has a
unique ability to make a major contribution to the prevention of computer crime.
Translation of the auditor's advantageous position into effective
computer crime prevention requires placing some of the responsibility
for the security of the client's computer system on the auditor. The most
effective means of shifting responsibility for computer security to the
auditing profession is to require certification of the client's computer
security system in every audit. 1 ' Presumably, AICPA standards for a
mandatory review of the client's system of computer security controls
would be similar to the standards applied when the client specifically requests a report on the overall system of internal control.1 3 Applying
these standards would increase auditor responsibility for computer
security drastically.111 Before issuing an opinion on the integrity of the
1"

STUDY

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, THE AUDITOR'S STUDY AND
AND

EVALUATION

OF INTERNAL

CONTROL IN

EDP SYSTEMS 9-13, 15-17 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as STUDY AND EVALUATION].
'= Id at 14-16, 18-20.
'
AICPA Professional Standards AU § 220.01. The AICPA requires the auditor to be
independent not only in fact but in appearance as well. Id. at § 220.02. But see Roddy, supra
note 7, at 349 (auditor independence curtailed by necessary reliance on employees of client
to operate computer).
'

See note 86 supra.

See Adams, supra note 122, at 1061. The SEC has considered requiring all
registered companies to file a certified report on the business' overall system of internal
control. See SEC Release No. 34-15772 (April 30, 1979) published in 17 SEC Docket 421 (May
15, 1979). A proposed SEC rule would require a report stating whether the system of internal control provides reasonable assurances against unauthorized dispositions of assets and
inaccurate financial reports. Id. at 421-22. The rule would also require disclosure of any
material weaknesses in the system of internal control. Id. at 421. Moreover, an independent
public accountant would have to examine and report on the statement on the system of internal control for the SEC to accept the statement. Id. at 422.
The SEC withdrew the proposed rule on June 6, 1980. See SEC Accounting Release
No. 278, SEC ACCOUNTING RULES (CCH) 1 3282. The SEC based the decision to withdraw the
rule on a desire to see voluntary action in the private sector toward reporting on internal
control. Id. at 3802. The SEC plans to monitor voluntary efforts for three years and defer
further action until that time. Id. at 3802-03. In the event that the monitoring program indicates that voluntary efforts are inadequate, the SEC stated that future regulatory action
is a possibility. Id. at 3803. Regardless of eventual regulatory action, the SEC recommended
that companies which must file with the SEC include audited reports on internal control
with other financial statements. Id. at 3817.
See generally SAS 30, supra note 121.
'
See SEC Accounting Release No. 278, SEC ACCOUNTING RULES (CCH) 3282 at 3816.
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client's system of controls over computer operations, AICPA standards
would require the auditors to make a detailed review of the design of the
system of controls1 34 and to test the client's compliance with existing procedures. ' The auditor's review of the design of the security system
would include a determination of whether the client has identified points
in the operation of the computer which are vulnerable to abuse. 8' Where
vulnerable points exist, the auditor would determine whether the user
has adopted procedures designed to prevent abuses.1 3 7 The standard
opinion that the AICPA recommends the auditor should issue following
an examination 38' would state that the client's system of computer control is sufficient to reasonably safeguard assets from loss.1 ' If a material
weakness exists in the system of controls, the auditor must disclose that
weakness in his opinion. 4 '
Despite the thoroughness that the AICPA requires of an auditor
before he can certify his client's system of computer security, mandatory
certification would not force the auditor to adopt significantly different
auditing procedures than procedures currently required in an audit. The
standards that the auditor would use to certify a client's system of computer security are very similar to the standards that govern the
auditor's review of the client's system of internal control in a regular
audit.4 The major difference is that the former situation requires the
auditor to express an opinion on the overall effectiveness of the controls
and disclose weaknesses while the latter situation serves only to deter4
mine the extent of testing required by the audit."
Mandatory certification of computer security as part of every audit would make the
auditor's liability for subsequently discovered computer fraud hinge
upon the auditor's adherence to standards designed to pinpoint deficiencies in computer security,4 rather than standards directed to maximizing the overall quality of the financial statements. " Thus, requiring
computer security certification would place responsibility for the identification of computer crime opportunities on the group best able to perform the task and recommend remedies. Moreover, the auditor's re"3

SAS 30, supra note 121, at 7.

11

Id. at 8.

Id. at 10.

Id at 8-9.
The auditor should issue a standard opinion only if the examination discovers no
material weaknesses in the client's system of internal control. Id. at 14. If the auditor finds a
material weakness, the opinion would describe the weakness, the cause of the weakness,
and the type of errors or irregularities that could result from the weakness. Id.
I&. at 13-14.
1
Id- at 14; see note 138 supra.
141 Compare text accompanying notes 132-37 supra with text accompanying notes
113-21 supra.
112 Compare SAS 30, supra note 121, at 10-15 with AICPA Professional Standards AU §
320.01.
"3 See text accompanying notes 134-140 supra.
1" See text accompanying note 120 supra.
11
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quisite familiarity with the client's system of internal control,"' coupled
with the auditor's existing responsibilities for reviewing the system
under current AICPA standards,14 would facilitate the shift of responsibility to the auditing profession.'47 Traditionally, however, only the
AICPA has promulgated additional requirements for auditors.'48 The
AICPA's enthusiasm for increasing the potential liability of its members
is doubtful.'49
In the absence of voluntary action on the part of the accounting profession, the government's options for increasing auditor responsibility
for computer security are limited. Ordinarily, the federal government
has declined to mandate auditing standards. 0 In some instances, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required auditors and
accountants to apply different standards to financial statements and
reports filed with the SEC than the standards required by the AICPA or
Financial Accounting Standards Board for certification.'' Attempts to
regulate the accounting profession through the SEC have, however, one
major deficiency. SEC regulations apply only to businesses that must
file with the SEC. 5' Thus, a regulation requiring that an auditor certify
the security of a client's security system would apply only to relatively
large, public corporations. 1
While the auditor's contribution to prevention and detection of computer crime consists of identification of potential problems and recommendation of solutions, the conceivable contribution to crime reporting
is more direct. Although auditors are in a position to discover computer
crimes,"' auditors normally do not report the incidents to law enforcement officials. The independent auditor's reluctance to report detected
crimes stems from a perceived ethical conflict between reporting a
discovery to law enforcement officials and simply allowing the client to
See text accompanying note 114 supra.
See text accompanying notes 127-28.
", See text accompanying notes 126-30.
4. J. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION To RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY 145-46 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CAREY]. But see note 131 supra.
"I The AICPA recently adopted a new auditing requirement relating to the auditor's
review of the client's system of internal control. Effective December 24, 1977, auditors are
required to report to the client any material weaknesses in the client's system of internal
control. AICPA Professional Standards AU § 323.01. The requirement applies, however, only
to weaknesses that come to the auditor's attention during the course of the examination. Id.
Thus, the requirements do not require the auditor to give an opinion on the overall quality of
the client's system of internal control.
15 See CAREY, supra note 148, at 146.
E.g., S.E.C. Accounting Release No. 261, SEC ACCOUNTING RULES (CCH) 3265 (accounting changes by oil and gas producers); of. FASB Stint. No. 19; AICPA Professional
Standards AC § 6021 (1977) (accounting standards for oil and gas producers).
"'

I~8

See note 81 supra.
1' See id.
1

1

See 1978 Hearings,supra note 24, at 46 (remarks of Senator Biden).
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handle the situation."' A statutory requirement that auditors report uncovered computer crime would relieve the auditor of the difficult decision of whether or not disclosure is necessary and would provide further
deterrence to the potential criminal. Furthermore, the considerations
that mitigate against requiring a user to report computer crimes are not
present in the auditor's case.15 Although requiring management to
report crimes could breed devisiveness within the business, crime
disclosure does not compromise the auditor's position as an independent,
external examiner. Also, since the auditor ordinarily will not benefit
from failing to disclose a crime, a mandatory reporting requirement is
likely to increase computer crime reporting. Mandatory reporting requirements, however, would constitute unprecedented government
regulation of the auditing profession."'
In order for the FCSPA to make a significant contribution to the control of computer crime substantial revisions are necessary. The current
form of the FCSPA does not encourage increased prevention, detection,
and reporting of computer crime." To remedy the deficiencies of the
FCSPA, Congress should consider measures directed at those groups
that can have the greatest deterrent effect on computer crime.5 9 Congress also could adopt a course of action designed to inform computer
users of the computer's potential for crime and the punishment that computer criminals can expect upon conviction."' 5 Another legislative
possibility is a requirement that users and auditors report detected computer improprieties to the proper authorities."1 Legislation could also
provide economic incentives to computer manufacturers to lessen the
lu 1978 Hearings, supra note 24, at 46-47 (remarks of Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Keeney); Volgyes, supra note 2, at 394.
1
See text accompanying note 95 supra.
See text accompanying note 150 supra;Moss, The Crisis of Corporate Accountability: A Legislator's View, 3 J. OF CORP. L. 251, 264-65 (1978) (government promulgation of
auditing standards unlikely). A recent 6th Circuit case suggests that judicially created
reporting requirements are unlikely. In Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d
422 (6th Cir.) cert denied sub nom. Adams v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., No. 80-659 (49
U.S.L.W. 3443, Dec. 15, 1980), a group of shareholders that had relied on an audited proxy
statement sought damages from the auditors that had certified the statement. Id. at 425.
One ground of the plaintiffs' claim stated that the auditors had failed to disclose material
weaknesses in the company's system of computer security controls. Id. at 431. The 6th Circuit reversed a trial court holding that the auditor's failure to disclose the weaknesses constituted fraud and, thus, the auditors should be held liable for damages caused by the fraud.
Id. at 431. The circuit court reasoned that since Generally Accepted Auditing Standards did
not require disclosure of material weaknesses to parties outside the company, the auditors
had no duty to disclose the weaknesses. Id. at 431-32; see note 149 supra. The Standard
Knitting Mills opinion indicates that courts will be hesitant to require auditors to report
client shortcomings in the absence of professional standards or legislative mandates.
" See text accompanying notes 66-76 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
I See text accompanying notes 89-92 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 93-96 & 154-57 supra.
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gap between data processing technology and security technology.162
Finally, Congress could exert pressure on the auditing profession to
adopt standards that shift some legal responsibility to auditors for the
overall integrity of an audit client's system of computer security.1" By
enacting measures'specifically directed at deterring computer crime,
Congress can begin to control a problem that will become increasingly
serious as computer use spreads. 64
ROBERT M. COUCH

162

See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.

16 See text accompanying notes 131-53 supra.
1

See note 2 and text accompanying note 3 supra.

